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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the public's consciousness of fitness and health matters has
combined with concerns over energy sufficiency and pollution to push the
concept of recreational trail systems to the political forefront. This is reflected
in a body of federal legislation-including the Trails Act Amendments-and
corresponding state statutes. These laws permit conversion of soon-to-be-
abandoned railroad rights-of-way for recreational trail use. As with most other
endeavors, conflicting positions as to the necessity, propriety, and cost
allocations associated with rails-to-trails conversions arose. This Note will
examine the important issues associated with implementing this policy. First,
this Note will give an overview of the federal statute and relevant procedures.
Second, this Note will examine the constitutional challenges recently dealt with
by the Supreme Court in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission. Third,
an examination of state case law will illustrate the crucial position played by
state property law. Fourth, a comparison of state rails-to-trails statutes will
demonstrate different approaches taken regarding trail conversions. Fifth, the
decisions of federal circuit courts will be analyzed in light of Preseault. Sixth,
the competing policy and economic interests in the rails-to-trails debate will be
contrasted. Finally, the prospects for rails-to-trails conversions will be
examined.
II. TRAILS ACT AMENDMENTS AND PROCEDURES
A. Predecessor Statutes
In order to meet the increasing needs of the public for recreation and access
to natural and historical resources, Congress passed the National Trails System
Act in 1968-the original predecessor to the Trails Act Amendments. 1 The Act
emphasized providing trails with access to urban and scenic areas.2 To aid in
the administration of the Act, this national system of trails utilizes nonprofit
organizations and other volunteers in planning, development, maintenance, and
management of trails.3
In addition to sections dealing with the National Trails System, the Act
promotes the development of trails at the state and local level. The Secretary of
I National Trails System Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (1988)).
2 Id. § 1241(a).
3 Id. § 1241(c).
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the Interior exercises the primary responsibility "to encourage States, political
subdivisions, and private interests, including nonprofit organizations, to
establish such trails."4 The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and
the Secretary of Agriculture also have responsibilities to encourage the creation
of trails.5
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4-R
Act) was a subsequent congressional attempt to promote trail use of railroad
rights-of-way. 6 One provision permitted the ICC to impose a 180-day waiting
period on sales and other transactions involving railroad properties "suitable
for public purposes," unless nongovernment sale offers were first made for
similar recreational purposes. 7 A second set of provisions provided for
exchanging information and expertise with private groups and government
agencies. 8 A third set of provisions appropriated funds to acquire and develop
rights-of-way for trail and other recreational uses.9 Annual funding grew from
six million dollars in 1976 to ten million dollars in 1983.10 A final provision, a
forerunner of the present Trails Act Amendments, initiated a study of alternate
uses of abandoned rights-of-way. 1'
Both the National Trails System Act and the 4-R Act sought to encourage
the conversion of abandoned railroad rights-of-way to recreational trails
through financial and other assistance to governmental agencies.12 From its
1920 peak of 272,000 miles, America's rail system declined to 141,000 miles
by 1990. Estimates place future losses at 3000 miles annually. 13 Congress
hoped that these measures would stem the disappearance of rights-of-way. 14
These measures, however, proved to be inadequate. 15
B. National TRails System Act Amendments of 1983
In response to the inadequacy of the Trails System Act and the 4-R Act,
Congress passed the Trails Act Amendments in 1983.16 Under the Trails Act
4 Id. § 1247(a).
5 Id. § 1247(b)-(c).
6 Railroad Revitaliztion and Regulatory Reform (4-R) Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
210, 90 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 5, 11, 15, 31, 45, 49
U.S.C.).
7 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1988).
8Id. at note (Conversion of Abandoned Railroad Rights-of-Way).
9 Id.
10 Id.
I IId. See Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 144-45 for complete text.
12 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990).
13 Id. at 5.14 Id.
15 Id. at6.
16 Id. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988).
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Amendments, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of the Interior, and
the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission have the responsibility
of encouraging state and local governments as well as private organizations to
reach agreements with the railroads for interim trail uses.' 7 If these
governments and organizations agree to assume complete responsibility for
maintenance, legal liability, and taxes concerning a right-of-way, the ICC will
transfer the right-of-way for conversion to trail use.' 8 The most controversial
aspect, though, prevents the reversionary interests of adjoining landowners
from vesting. The critical provisions dealing with the rails-to-trails conversions
are as follows:
Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance of the national
policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of
rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy
efficient transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established
railroad rights-of-way .... if such interim use is subject to restoration or
reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for
purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such
rights-of-way for railroad purposes. 19
C. ICC Procedures
According to the Trails Act Amendments, certain steps must be taken
before a railroad right-of-way can be converted to interim trail use. First, any
interested governments or organizations must file with the ICC a comment or
petition expressing this interest.20 This comment or petition should include the
following: A map and description of the right-of-way; a statement of
willingness to assume complete responsibility for management, legal liability,
and taxes; and a statement acknowledging that trail use is subject to
management responsibilities and future resumption of rail service.21 In
"regulated" proceedings, the comment is due within thirty days after the
railroad files an abandonment application; in "exemption" proceedings, a
petition must be filed within ten days after the Federal Register publishes the
17 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988).
18Id.
19 Id.
20 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a) (1991). In "regulated" proceedings, abandonments follow
procedures set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 10904. In "exemption" proceedings, certain
abandonments (defined in 49 U.S.C. § 10505(a)) follow simplified procedures. See
generally CHARLES H. MONTANGE, PRESERVING ABANDONED RAILROAD RIGHTS-OF-
WAY FOR PUBLIC USE: A LEGAL MANuAL 19-31 (1989).
21 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(2)-(3).
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Notice of Exemption. 22 Despite these rigid deadlines, the ICC has been flexible
in accepting late requests.23
Second, the ICC issues a Certificate or Notice of Interim Trail Use
(C1TU/N1TU) if the railroad intends to reach a trail-use agreement. Thirty days
after the CITU/N1TU is issued, the railroad may discontinue service and
salvage equipment. If an agreement has not been reached within 180 days after
the CITU/NITU was issued, the railroad may abandon the right-of-way. 24 The
ICC, however, will extend the six-month negotiation period at the parties'
request, even in the face of landowner objections.25 If the railroad does not
intend to negotiate an agreement, a normal certificate of abandonment or
exemption notice is issued. Even then, a C1TU/N1TU can later be issued if the
railroad changes its mind and decides to negotiate.26
III. PRESEAULTV. ICC
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission concerns an assertion that
the Trails Act Amendments violate the Commerce Clause as well as the Fifth
Amendment, which requires compensation for a taking of property for public
use.27 The taking question arises in many instances of conversion, because
railroad rights-of-way frequently take the form of easements or similar property
interests, which will revert to the adjoining landowner when abandonment as to
rail use takes place. 28 The Trails Act Amendments prevent a reversion of
property interests, which would otherwise take place under state law. 29
A. Facts of Preseault
In Preseault, the owners of land adjoining a right-of-way brought a quiet-
title action in the Superior Court of Chittenden County, Vermont, based on a
claim that abandonment of the right-of-way had caused it to revert to them. 30
The court, based on the lack of an ICC authorization of abandonment,
22 Id. § 1152.29(b)(1)-(2).
23 Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 848 F.2d 1246, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
24 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c)-(d).
25 Policy Statement on Rails-to-Trails Conversions, ICC, Jan. 29, 1990, available in
WL, FIRAN-ICC Database [hereinafter Policy Statement].
26 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c)-(d).
27 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 4. Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power "[tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States ... .' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution declares "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V.28 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 8.
29 Id. at8.
30 Id. at 9.
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dismissed the action. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court ruling.31 The landowners then requested a certificate of
abandonment from the ICC. The State of Vermont and the railroad, however,
intervened to petition the ICC to transfer the right-of-way to the City of
Burlington for trail use.32 The ICC subsequently granted the petition and
denied the landowners' motion to reconsider or clarify.33
The landowners appealed the ICC's decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, claiming a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and of the Commerce Clause.34 The Court of Appeals rejected the
Fifth Amendment argument, stating that no taking had occurred, because a
reversion does not vest until the ICC declares that the right-of-way has been
abandoned. The court also rejected the Commerce Clause argument, finding
that Congress' stated goals in encouraging trail development and preserving
rights-of-way for future rail use were proper. 35 The landowners appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 36
B. Constitutional Issues
The takings problem dealt with in Preseault involves two distinct issues.
The first concerns the propriety of congressional rails-to-trails legislation as it
relates to the Commerce Clause. The second concerns the need to compensate
for a taking of property in implementing the legislation. As Justice Brennan
noted in Preseault, "The [Fifth] Amendment 'does not prohibit the taking of
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power.'" 37 In the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made this distinction
as follows: "The scope of the Commission's authority to regulate
abandonments, thereby delimiting the ambit of federal power, is an issue quite
distinct from whether the Commission's exercise of power over matters within
its jurisdiction effected a taking of petitioners' property." 38
1. Commerce Clause
In regard to the Commerce Clause, the Court held that enactment of the
rails-to-trails legislation was a proper exercise of congressional power. The
3 ld.
32 Id.
33 cLd at 9_10.
34 Id. at 10.
35 Id.
3 6 Id.
37 Id. at 11 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)).3 8 Id. at 22 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
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Court determined that the legislation's dual purposes of promoting recreational
trail development and of preserving rights-of-way for future railroad uses (i.e.,
"rail banking") fell within the scope of the commerce power.39 Although the
petitioners claimed that the rail-banking purpose was only a pretext to create
the trails, the Court observed that, even if this were true, the legislation need
only serve one valid purpose.40
The Court reiterated its use of the traditional rational basis test for
Commerce Clause cases. That is, if Congress has a rational basis in believing
that a matter affects interstate commerce, court review is limited to ensuring a
rational relationship between the legislation and the desired ends.41
Furthermore, the existence of alternatives that might be more effective does not
invalidate the measures actually chosen by Congress.42
2. Compensation Under the Fifth Amendment
As to the compensation question, the Court stated that the rails-to-trails
amendment did not preclude compensation for any takings that actually arose.43
The Court did not address whether, in this instance, there was a taking
requiring compensation. No denial of compensation for a government taking of
property occurred, because no claim for compensation was ever made pursuant
to the Tucker Act. 44
The Tucker Act gives the United States Claims Court jurisdiction over
"any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or
an Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department." 45 The
district courts also have jurisdiction over these claims, if the amounts involved
do not exceed 10,000 dollars.46 Contrary to the Preseaults' argument, the
Court noted that the omission of an explicit legislative reference to the Tucker
Act did not preclude that remedy.47 Because compensation claims could be
pursued under the Tucker Act, the Preseaults' failure to do so rendered their
Fifth Amendment challenge premature. 48
39 Id. at 18-19.
40 ld.
41 IL at 17 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981)).42 Id. at 19.
43 Id. at 13.
44Id. at 17.
45 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988).
46 Id. § 1346(a)(2).
47 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 13.
49 Id. at 17. The Preseaults subsequently filed suit in the United States Claims Court.
On January 8, 1992, the court granted partial summary judgment for the Preseaults. The
court held the following: First, the property rights at issue were easements; second, the
Preseaults possessed the reversionary rights underlying the easements; and third, the
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IV. DEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS
Whether a governmental action constitutes a public-use taking requiring
compensation largely depends on the operation of state law. This is because
state law defines the property rights that are subject to the coverage of the Fifth
Amendment. 49 Even a short-term invasion of property rights may constitute a
taking. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, the United States Supreme Court declared that "'temporary'
takings... are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires compensation." 50 In this light, the Court in
Preseault did not accept the reasoning of the circuit court, which believed that
the ICC's authority over railroad abandonments affected the reversionary
interests themselves. 51 Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he Commission's
actions may delay property owners' enjoyment of their reversionary interests,
but that delay burdens and defeats the property interest rather than suspends or
defers the vesting of those property rights." 52 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
appeared to suspect the circuit court's emphasis that a reversionary interest had
not come to fruition.53 As the Restatement of Property says, if an event
triggering a reversionary interest will probably occur in a short period of time,
the property in question should be treated as a fee simple absolute estate for
eminent domain purposes. 54
Thus, the property interests involved under state law must be defined
before it is possible to answer the question of whether or not a rails-to-trails
conversion constitutes a taking. If the railroad owns a right-of-way in fee
simple absolute, the takings question does not arise. If, however, the railroad
easements were abandoned and extinguished under Vermont law, triggering the
reversionary interests. Whether or not the Trails Act Amendments pre-empted the
Preseaults' reversionary rights remains to be decided. Preseault v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct.
818 (1992).
49 Id. at 9; see also id. at 20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987).
51 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 23-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 22 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
53 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d
694, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
54 RESrATaEMT OF PROPERTY § 53 cmt. c (1936). Compare Hemphill v. Miss. State
Highway Comm'n, 145 So. 2d 455 (Miss. 1962) (probability test used) and Chew v.
Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 621 (Pa. 1960) widh People V rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. City
of Fresno, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (mere possibility of reversion is
insufficient to establish probability of reversion).
1992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
holds the right-of-way as an easement or similar property interest, the state law
definition of an abandonment is crucial.55
With this in mind, Congress passed the rails-to-trails amendments with the
hope of minimizing takings that would require compensation.5 6 The ICC
interpreted its statutory authority as not including the power to force the
railroads to reach trail-use agreements. 57 Even though this hope of avoiding
takings problems has not been completely realized, the ICC's interpretation
furthered the goals of avoiding takings disputes (at least in relation to the
railroads' property interests). 58
Property rights regarding easements for railroad rights-of-way vary across
the United States, the differences being dependent on variances in state law and
the nature of the easements involved. 59 The following cases indicate the split
among the states as to whether rails-to-trails conversions constitute
abandonments of railroad rights-of-way.
A. Rails-to-Trails Conversions Are Not Abandonments in Some States
Two cases have held that a right-of-way conversion under a state's rails-to-
trails statutes did not constitute an abandonment by the railroad. In Rieger v.
Penn Central Corp., an Ohio court of appeals held that such a conversion
under section 1519.02 of the Ohio Revised Code did not constitute an
abandonment of the right-of-way.60 As the court noted, both uses of the
easement involved "a public way to facilitate the transportation of persons and
property."61
In State by Washington Widlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, the Minnesota
Supreme Court similarly held that a conversion under sections 84.209 and
85.015 of the Minnesota statutes did not constitute an abandonment.62As the
court stated, "The right-of-way is still being used as a right-of-way for
transportation .... " 63 Significantly, both of these decisions concerned
55 Preseault, 494 U.S. at 8.
56 Id. at 8 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-28, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 119-20).
5 7 Policy Statement, supra note 25.5 8 Washington State Dep't of Game v. ICC, 829 F.2d 877, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1987).
59 National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
60 Rieger v. Penn Central Corp., No. 85-CA-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Greene County May
21, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). See also infra notes 96-98 and accompanying
text.
61 Id. (quoting Hatch v. Cincinnati & Ind. R.R., 18 Ohio St. 92, 122 (1864)).
62 State by Wash. Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 544 (Minn.
1983). See also infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
63 Washington Wildlife Preservation, 329 N.W.2d at 547.
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prescriptive easements. In cases dealing with easements explicitly limited by
contract or statute to railroad use, courts consistently find abandonments. 64
B. Rails-to-Trails Conversions Are Abandonments in Some States
Despite the holdings of Ohio and Minnesota cases, a number of state courts
have taken exactly the opposite approach in handling interim trail conversions
that involve railroad easements. Pollnow v. State Department of Natural
Resources also concerned a prescriptive easement, but the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that the easement was for railroad purposes only. As this court
declared, "The majority rule is that a railroad company acquires by
prescription or adverse possession only an easement in a right of way." 65
Because the easement reverted to the adjoining landowners upon abandonment
by the railroad, the railroad could not convey the easement to the state for trail
use.66 The court acknowledged the power of Congress and the legislature to
provide for multiple uses of rights-of-way. It rejected, however, the rationale
that the easement remained intact because recreational trail use still constituted
public transportation. 67
Likewise, courts dealing with easements explicitly limited by statutes or
contracts to railroad use have consistently held that conversions to trail use do
constitute abandonments of the rights-of-way. 68 In Lawson v. State, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that owners of reversions "have
enforceable legal rights.., which are protected under the takings provisions of
our constitution." 69 This decision held that conversions without compensation,
as authorized by section 64.04.190 of the Revised Code of Washington,
violated the state constitution. 70
In McKinley v. Waterloo Railroad Co., the Iowa Supreme Court also held
that an easement, condemned for railroad purposes according to statute, was
abandoned when the right-of-way was converted to trail use.7' The court
distinguished this case from Washington Wildlife Preservation on the grounds
64 This contrast was noted by a federal court of appeals in National Wildlife Fed'n v.
ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A prescriptive easement is created by adverse,
open and notorious, and continuous use of property during a statutory time period. RALPH
E. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 569 (3d ed. 1981).
65 Pollnow v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 276 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Wis. 1979).
66 Id.
6 7 Id.
68 See supra text accompanying note 64.
69 Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1308, 1315 (Wash. 1986). See also King County v.
Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).7 0 Lawson, at 458, 730 P.2d at 1316. See also infra notes 102-03 and accompanying
71 McKinley v. Waterloo R.R., 368 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Iowa 1985).
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that the latter did not concern an easement specifically restricted to railroad
purposes. 72
Similarly, in Schnabel v. County of DuPage, an Illinois appellate court
rejected the rationale that because both trail and railroad uses were public uses,
a rails-to-trails conversion did not constitute an abandonment. 73 The lower
court reasoned that because the trail use was of "public character" and would
not additionally burden the servient estates, an exception to normal
abandonment standards was appropriate.74 The appellate court noted, however,
that "[n]o court in Illinois has recognized such an exception to the normal rule
of abandonment and denied return of the use of the encumbered property to the
grantor, his heirs, or assigns." 75
V. COMPARATIVE STATE STATUTES
A number of states have enacted their own versions of rails-to-trails
statutes. As in other areas of legislation, the states have displayed a wide
variety of approaches in dealing with this public policy issue.76 Although many
states utilize general recreational trails statutes, several states specifically
provide for acquisition and use of railroad right-of-way. Some have even gone
so far as to enact laws that mirror the federal Trails Act Amendments and its
provisiois for conversion of abandoned rights-of-way to interim trail use.
Descriptions of a number of state recreational trail statutes follow. 77
A. State Rails-to-Trails Statutes
1. Maryland
In May 1990, the Maryland legislature enacted section 5-1010 of the
Natural Resources Article, creating the Maryland Rails-to-Trails program. 78
This statute declared the public's interest in preserving railroad rights-of-way
for recreational trail use and future railroad use.79 Thus, the state created a
"systematic and continuing statewide program of acquiring abandoned railroad
corridor property." 80
72 Id. at 135.
73 Shnabel v. County of DuPage, 428 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1981).
74 Id.
75 Id.
7 6 MONTANGE, supra note 20, at 112.
77 See id. at 130-32 for a list of many of these statutes.
7 8 MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 5-1010 (Supp. 1991).
79 Id. § 5-1010(a)(1)-(5).80Id. §5-1010(a)(5).
[Vol. 53:337
RAILS-TO-TRAILS
Under the statute, the Department of Natural Resources consults with
government bodies, including the Department of Transportation, the State
Railroad Administration, and local governments concerning possible trail
usage.81 The Department of Natural Resources may also request that rights-of-
way acquired by the Department of Transportation be used for trails. 82
Furthermore, one provision permits acquiring property according to procedures
set forth in the amended National Trails System Act.8 3 The Office of Planning
coordinates the activities of the relevant departments and agencies, as well as
relations with the ICC. 84
2. Florida
Sections 260.011 to 260.018 of the Florida Statutes comprise a
comprehensive plan entitled the Florida Recreational Trails System. Uses for
the trails include hiking, bicycling, and horseback riding, as well as
canoeing. 85 One of the legislation's major goals consists of connecting national,
state, and local parks and forests. The acquisition of railroad rights-of-way
comprises the primary means of constructing the trail system.86 The
Department of Natural Resources administers the trails system.8 7
As part of the statewide trails system, section 260.0141 established the
Florida Rails to Trails Program. 88 Unlike other properties, rights-of-way may
be acquired regardless of the projected values of the trails.8 9 Rights-of-way
may be obtained through purchase or gift.90 The statute, however, limits using
eminent domain to curing title defects. 91
The Division of Parks and Recreation bears much of the responsibility for
the trail system. Crucial functions include ranking trail projects based on
anticipated need and costs, keeping a current list of rights-of-way that have
been or are soon to be abandoned, and providing this information to
organizations and government agencies. 92The Division appoints members of an
advisory body, the Florida Recreational Trails Council. 93 The Division also co-
ordinates the activities of government bodies involved in trail system
81 Id. § 5-1010(b)(1).
82 Id. § 5-1010(c)(1).
83 Ld. § 5-1010(b)(3).
84 MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-402(g)(1) to (3) (Supp. 1991).
85 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 260.012(1) (West 1991).86 Id. § 260.012(2).
8 7 Id. § 260.012(3).
88 ld. § 260.0141.
89 Id. § 260.015(1)(c).
90 Id. § 260.015(2)(a)-Qb).
91 Id. § 260.015(1)(a).
92 Id. § 260.016(2).
93 Id. § 260.016(1)(e).
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development. 94 The Department of Transportation, which must permit interim
trail use on its rights-of-way whenever possible, actively cooperates with the
Division.95
B. State Recreational Trails Statutes with Erplicit Provisions for the Use
of Railroad Rights-of-Way
1. Ohio
Section 1519.01 of the Ohio Revised Code gives the director of the
Department of Natural Resources the responsibility for planning and
administering the state's trails system. The legislation emphasizes connecting
trails among recreational and historical locations. 96
Section 1519.02 permits the director to acquire property for use as
recreational trails. Two provisions, though, limit this power. First, the statute
limits acquisitions to land "along a canal, watercourse, stream, existing or
abandoned road, highway, street, logging road, [or] railroad ... "97 Second,
no more than twenty-five acres of land per mile of trail may be acquired, and
permissible trail uses exclude motorized vehicles. The director, however, has
the power to transfer the land to other units of government and reach
agreements with private organizations to facilitate trail maintenance. 98
2. Minnesota
Section 84.029 of the Minnesota Statutes gives the Commissioner of
Natural Resources the responsibility of developing and administering
recreational trails and canoe routes.99 Land may be obtained by gift, purchase,
or lease. This authority limits acquisitions to purposes such as connecting
existing trails or concurrent vehicular use, but this limitation does not apply to
acquiring abandoned railroad rights-of-way. 1°° Unlike many states, statutes
enacted by the legislature largely determine trail locations.101
94 Id. § 260.016(1)(d).
95 Id. § 260.0161
96 Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 1519.01 (Anderson 1990).
97 Id. § 1519.02.
98 Id.
99 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.029 (Subdivision 2) (West 1977).
100 Id.




The Washington legislature, in section 64.04.180 of the Revised Code of
Washington, articulated the state's interest in preserving railroad rights-of-way
as "public utility and transportation corridors." 1°2 In 1988, both sections
64.04.180 and 64.04.190 were amended not to preclude constitutionally
required compensation. 10 3 This action by the legislature was taken in response
to Lawson v. State, in which the Supreme Court of Washington held that a
rails-to-trails conversion violated the state constitution when the owners of the
reversionary interests were not compensated. 104
The provisions regarding the development of walking, bridle, and bicycle
paths display the importance placed on the trail system. For example, a trail
must be rebuilt if the construction of a highway would interfere with its use.105
Expending highway and road funds for trails and paths provides critical
funding. 1° 6 Indeed, cities and counties must generally spend at least one-half
percent of motor vehicle tax receipts for trails and paths. 10 7
4. Iowa
Section 111F.2 of the Iowa Code gives the Department of Transportation
the responsibility to plan "the acquisition, development, promotion, and
management of recreational trails throughout the state."10 8 The Iowa legislature
gives priority to acquiring property, which completes other trails, uses railroad
rights-of-way, and accommodates a number of uses (including transportation
and utilities). 10 9
5. New York
Section 3.09 of the New York Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation
Law gives a Commissioner the authority to implement the statewide trail
system."I°Abandoned railroad rights-of-way may be purchased with funds
appropriated by the legislature for this purpose.11
102 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.180 (West 1991).
103 1988 WASH. LAws ch. 16 § 1.
I 4 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
105 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.30.010(3).
106 Id. § 47.30.060.
107 Id. § 47.30.050(1).
10 8 IOWA CODE ANN. § 111F.2.1 (West 1991).
109 Id. § 111F.2.3.
110 N.Y. PARKS REC. &HIST. PRES. LAW § 3.09 (McKinney 1984).
III Id.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[
6. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation, which has the right of first
acquisition, controls the disposition of abandoned railroad rights-of-way. This
property may be acquired by purchase, gift, or even eminent domain. 112 The
potential for future rail and other transportation uses constitutes the key factor
in acquiring this land. Nonetheless, the statute provides for land transfers to
another government body for "recreational purposes." 113
C. State Recreational Trails Statutes Without Explicit Provision for Use
of Rights-of-Way
Some states that have enacted recreational trails statutes do not mention the
use of abandoned railroad rights-of-way by name. Nonetheless, conversion for
interim trail use can play an important part in the statewide trail plan. Some
examples follow.
1. California
Article 6 of the Public Resources Code enacted the wide-ranging and
ambitious California Recreational Trails System. 114 Implementing this
"statewide system of recreational and interpretive trails" includes encouraging
other government bodies and private groups to get involved in trail
development.1 15 The director of this system develops and updates a plan that
assesses present and future needs and which emphasizes trails linked to traverse
a number of "scenic, natural, historic, and recreational areas of statewide
significance."1 16
Funding priorities in the statute complement the efforts of the rails-to-trails
movement. Railroad lines have served as a major transportation link among
metropolitan areas. As such, a priority in funding trails accessible to urban
areas would aid in preserving abandoned rights-of-way for trail use.117
Additionally, trails receive priority if they involve "other public agencies,
cooperating volunteer trail associations, or any combination of those entities, in
state trail acquisition, development, or maintenance." 118 This provision mirrors
one in the federal rails-to-trails statute.
112 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 85.09(2) (West 1990).
113 Id. § 85.09(4).
114 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5070 (West 1984).
115 Id. § 5070.5(0, (i).
116 Id. § 5070.7(b)
1 17 Id. § 5075.3(a)(1).
118 Id. § 5075.3(a)(4).
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Responding to objections similar to those raised by opponents of interim
trail use, California's trail statute protects adjoining land owners to a greater
extent than do most other states. Under the California statute, evaluation of trail
routes must include consideration of the impact on the landowners. 119 Trails
are also to be located so as to minimize adverse impacts on the landowners. 120
Most importantly, fences are required to be installed along a trail if requested
by an adjoining landowner. 121
2. Kentucky
The Department of Parks administers the Kentucky Trails System.122 Co-
operation with the federal government plays an important part in the job of
administration. In fact, section 148.770 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
encourages the incorporation of state trails into the system of national trails. 1 3
The Kentucky legislature mandated that this support for trail development,
though, should be balanced by efforts to minimize negative impacts on land
owners.
12 4
VI. PRESEAULT V. ICC IN PERSPECIVE
The Supreme Court's decision in Preseault helped clarify the decisions of
three federal circuit courts that specifically addressed the takings question
presented by the 1983 Amendments to the National Trails System Act. The
Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding as to Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause and the availability of a Tucker Act remedy. 125 The Court
did not, however, accept the Second Circuit's position that the ICC's authority,
rather than state law, determined the property rights at issue. 126
The Supreme Court's holding in Preseault also confirmed the Eighth
Circuit's ruling that the rails-to-trails amendments were a valid exercise of the
commerce power. 127 The Eighth Circuit, as did the Second Circuit, held that
compensation could be obtained for takings pursuant to the Tucker Act. 128
119 I § 5075.7 (West Supp. 1992).
120 Id. § 5075.3(d).
121 Id. § 5075.3(i).
122 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148.750 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1987).
123 Id. § 148.770.
124 Id. § 148.670(1).
125 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990), aff'g 853 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1988).
126 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
127 Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 879 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1989).
128 Id. at 325.
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Finally, Preseault affirmed a District of Columbia Circuit's holding, which
recognized the primacy of state law in determining property rights. 129 The
circuit court emphasized this point by remanding the case to the ICC to
reconsider its position that the 1983 Amendments would never result in a
taking requiring compensation. 130 The court declared that "the Commission
cites no authority for the proposition that government action that precludes the
vesting of a reversionary interest does not constitute a taking of property." 131
After remand, the ICC changed its position on the takings question, as
reflected in its Policy Statement on Rails-to-Trails Conversions, which was
decided January 29, 1990. The pertinent portion is as follows:
2. Compensation is available to holders of reversionary property interests. The
most difficult and controversial issue facing us under the Trails Act has related
to reversionary property interests. In our rules we initially took the position
that the interests of adjacent or reversionary landowners never require
protection or compensation under the Fifth Amendment because an interim
trail use arrangement is only a temporary postponement of the vesting of
reversionary interests....
. . . We did not attempt to establish the parameters for when a
compensable taking occurs, since procedures are available under the Tucker
Act (28 U.S.C. 1491) to address any taking claims that landowners might
have. We emphasized that the Claims Court has the expertise to decide takings
questions and is in the best position to do so. 13 2
The full impact of the Court's decision in Preseault has yet to be felt. A
hint as to the future of trail conversion litigation, though, arose in Coos v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, the first federal post-Preseault case
interpreting the Trails Act Amendments. 133 Following Preseault's rejection of
the unconstitutional takings challenge, the landowners dropped similar
claims. 134 In Goos, the Eighth Circuit then rejected the claim that the ICC was
required to consider the environmental impact of a conversion to trail use in
deciding whether to permit this conversion. 135
This court accepted the ICC's position that it exercises extremely little
discretion in rails-to-trails conversions because Congress had already decided
129 National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
130 Id. at 708.
131 Id. at 704.
132 Policy Statement, supra note 25.
133 Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1990).
13 4 Id. at 1287-88.
135 Id. at 1297. The ICC took the position that the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988), only required an environmental impact evaluation of the
proposed abandonment itself. Id. at 1287.
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that all trails were worth preserving through rail banking.136 Using that
reasoning, the ICC previously decided that the Trails Act Amendments did not
permit it to force a conversion to interim trail use if the parties were not
willing. The ICC extended this idea to preclude it from blocking a voluntary
trail conversion agreement. 137 Because the ICC's "ministerial" role involved
such limited discretion, the court held that the environmental impact of trail
conversions did not have to be evaluated. 138 As Judge Beam noted, "[I]t would
make little sense to force the I.C.C. to consider factors which cannot affect its
decision... "139
This decision, which reiterated the ICC's limited powers regarding trail
conversions, presented rails-to-trails advocates with a significant victory.
Previously, Connecticut Trust for Historic Preservation v. Interstate Commerce
Commission upheld the ICC's interpretation of its own powers as precluding
the ICC from forcing unwilling parties to make trail conversions. 140
Proponents of interim trail use derided the ICC's interpretation as "[n]arrow
and [u]nreasonable" and saw the Second Circuit's decision as a major
defeat. 141 The decision in Goos showed that this construction of the statute is a
two-edged sword, in that adjoining landowners similarly cannot use the ICC to
block a voluntary interim trail-use agreement.
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The rails-to-trails debate has produced some unusual alliances. On one side
are government agencies, trail operators and users (such as hikers and
bicyclists), conservation groups, and historic preservation organizations. 142 On
the other side are land developers, ranchers, and farmers. 143 Both sides start
from different premises regarding the need, means, and underlying philosophy
connected with the conversion of railroad rights-of-way to interim trail use.
A. Government Regulation vs. Taking of Property
The first point of contention whether interim trail use constitutes traditional
government regulation or a taking of property. Trail advocates contend that a
136 Id. at 1295.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1295-96.
139 Id. at 1296.
140 Connecticut Trust for Historic Preservation v. ICC, 841 F.2d 479, 482 (2d Cir.
1988).
141 MONTANGE, supra note 20, at 39.
142 Brief of Rails-to-Trails Conservancy at 2, Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990)
(No. 88-1076) [hereinafter RTC Brief].
143 David Burwell, Unanimous!, TRAILBLAZER, Apr.-June 1990, at 2.
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right-of-way is a "public highway," much like a limited access highway for
automobile use.144 They observe that under the common law, public highways
have historically been subject to government regulation.1 45 In particular,
railroads have long been regulated in the United States under the Commerce
Clause.146
Proponents make two arguments as to why trail conversions are merely
regulatory actions. First, trail conversions resemble ICC orders that delay
abandonments and require railroad service to continue, both of which postpone
the vesting of reversionary interests. 147 Second, because Congress could have
constitutionally preserved rights-of-way through means such as requiring
railroads to continue service or purchasing the land outright, less burdensome
means of preserving rights-of-way should be permissible. 14s Interim trail use
helps to preserve presently uneconomical rights-of-way for future use by
shifting costs from the railroads to the trail operators. 149 As such, the Trails
Act Amendments are a "reasonable regulation" to achieve the goal of providing
for this future use.' 50 This line of reasoning would not only preclude
compensation to adjoining landowners holding reversionary interests but would
also preclude compensation to railroads holding fee simple interests. 151
Trail opponents, though, do not accept this reasoning. They point out that
the easements were designated for specific purposes when the railroads
obtained the rights-of-way. Specifically, the railroads acquired the rights-of-
way in their capacity as public utilities. 152 Trail conversions do not constitute
mere regulation of railroads or public transportation. Rather, trail conversions
closely resemble the traditional use of governmental power to take land for
roads and highways, which requires landowner compensation. Thus,
compensation must be paid to landowners in instances of trail conversions.
144 Brief Amici Curiae Iowa Ass'n County Conservation Bds. at 17-18, Preseault v.
ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 88-1076) [hereinafter Iowa Ass'n Brief].
145 Brief in opposition at 7, Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 88-1076) (citing
3 JuLIus L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.33[2]
(3d ed. 1985)).
146 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (citing Colorado v. U.S., 271 U.S. 153
(1926)).
14 7 RTC Brief, supra note 142, at 20-21.
14 8 Id. at 22.
149 Iowa Ass'n Brief, supra note 144, at 5, 13.
15 0 Id. at 10.
151 Charles H. Montange, Converting About-to-be Abandoned Railroad Rights-of-Way
to Recreational Trails, RIGHT OF WAY, October 1986, at 7.
152 Telephone conversation with Robert E. Bash, Director of Public Affairs for the
Ohio Farm Bureau (January 31, 1991).
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B. Public Use vs. Abandonment
The second point of disagreement concerns whether trail conversion
constitutes an abandonment. Proponents view both railroads and trails as forms
of public transportation and, as such, give a broad construction as to
appropriate uses of railroad rights-of-way.' 53 Because a right-of-way, as a
public highway, is capable of a number of public uses consistent with its terms,
trail advocates contend that no additional compensation to the reversionary
interest owner is necessary. They see requiring additional compensation as
paying twice for a property interest that was paid for when the right-of-way
was acquired originally. 154
Opponents counter that railroad use is a special purpose which is unlike
recreational trail use.155 Abandonment of a railroad right-of-way triggers the
reversionary interests of adjoining landowners. After the conclusion of railroad
service, adjoining landowners assumed that the land would return to them. 156
They thus oppose legislation, such as the Trails Act Amendments, which
interferes with the operation of reversionary rights. 157 As such, trail
conversions constitute a second and distinct taking of the property, requiring
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
C. Nominal vs. Full Compensation
The third main argument concerns the compensation due a landowner if it
is determined that a taking of property has occurred. Proponents claim that
whether the interest acquired in a railroad right-of-way was an easement or fee
simple is irrelevant. Because the easement was acquired for an indefinite
period, compensation was set at the same amount as if a fee simple interest
were acquired. 158 Indeed, landowners should realize that reversions are subject
to extensive government regulation, one of whose purposes is to prevent the
extinguishment of easements suitable for public uses. 159 Thus, the value of the
reversion would be nominal.
153 RTC Brief, supra note 142, at 27.
154 Brief in Opposition, supra note 145, at 15.
155 Bash, supra note 152.
156 Id.
157 AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, FARM BUREAU POuCIES FOR 1990:
RESOLUTIONS ON NATIONAL ISSUES, 81 (1990).
158 RTC Brief, supra note 142, at 3-4. See, e.g., People ex tel. Dep't of Pub. Works
v. City of Fresno, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 862-63 (1963) (The court held that the possibility of
reversion in the indefinite future "was of such a nebulous nature that it had no legally
estimable market value.").
159 Iowa Ass'n Brief, supra note 144, at 15.
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Opponents counter that they should be paid market value for the property.
In particular, they dispute proponents' claims regarding the valuation of the
reversionary interests. They believe that the easements were practically "given"
to the railroads with the understanding that the land would someday revert to
the landowners. 160 Compensation for easements thus did not approach that of
fee simple interests. Thus, compensation for rails-to-trails conversions must be
paid at the time they are made. 161
D. Negative vs. Positive Effects
The fourth point of disagreement concerns the effects of trail use on the
adjoining property. Opponents perceive the threat of lower property values
when land lies along a recreational trail. They fear that an influx of trail users
will lead to increased littering and trespassing. The lack of public facilities
along many trails also presents a nuisance threat to adjoining properties. 162
Opponents thus call for strict enforcement of trespass laws along trails. 163
Proponents, on the other hand, cite reports of government agencies
showing increased property values and no increase in litter or crime for land
adjoining already established trails. 164 If the latter holds true for trails in
general, not only would the trails be "good neighbors," but costs associated
with landowners' claims for damages would also be minimized. 165
E. Private Ownership vs. Public Function
The fifth conflict has its roots in a general disagreement over the proper
role of government in a free society. Opponents note that the vast landholdings
of the federal government conflict with notions of private ownership and the
free enterprise system. 166 They also contend that using the immense and
coercive power of government to develop recreational trails undermines private
160 Bash, supra note 152.
161 Some landowners have demanded compensation beyond the value of the land itself.
For example, some landowners in Missouri want $5,000 per mile annually, based on their
calculations as to the going rate for fiber optic leases. Charles H. Montange, 7he Supreme
Court Affrm the Federal Trail Use and Railbanldng Statute, RIGHT OF WAY, June 1990, at
14.
162 Bash, supra note 152.
163 AMERICAN FARM BURE U FEDERATION, supra note 157, No. 116.
164 MONTANGE, supra note 20, at 139-40. Telephone interviews of public safety
officials conducted by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and a trail study
conducted by the Seattle Engineering Department comprise two of these reports. Id.16 5 Montange, supra note 161, at 14.
16 6 AMEcAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, supra note 157, No. 25.
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property rights. 167 Opponents object to the National Trails System Act
precisely because it permits abandoned rights-of-way to be converted to
recreational trails rather than revert to the adjoining landowners. 168
Trail proponents respond that much government-owned land is
inappropriate for trail use and that providing for recreational needs is a
traditional function of government. 169 Proponents also point to other purposes
that may be simultaneously advanced by rails-to-trails conversions such as
attracting businesses with potential resumption of rail service. 170 Additionally,
organizations involved with environmental concerns note the preservation of
wildlife habitats and prairie remnants as important effects of trail
development.171
VIII. THE FUTURE OF RAILS-TO-TRAILS
By 1990, over 3100 miles of trails created from abandoned railroad rights-
of-way had been developed. 172 This mileage is the total from 242 trails in 34
states. 173 At this time, Washington and Illinois have the most total miles and
largest number of these trails. Other leaders include Wisconsin, Michigan,
Minnesota, California, Pennsylvania, and Iowa. 174 Interim trail use has thus
become a significant recreational resource.
The ruling of a unanimous Supreme Court in Preseault, upholding the
constitutionality of interim trail use, has given further impetus to the
movement. Many trail conversions were put on hold pending a decision in the
case. 175 After the decision, negotiations having the potential of adding another
1100 miles of trails were either started or completed. 176 Trail proponents thus
exude optimism as a result of this decision. The president of the Rails-to-Trails
Conservancy termed it "a very real turning point for the rails-to-trails
167 Federal Bills Affectng Property Rghts, Citizens to Preserve Property Rights
Newsletter, May 1988, at 2.
168 AmMCAN FARMBUREAU FEDERATON, supra note 157, No. 150.
16 9 MONTANGE, supra note 20, at 140.
170 Iowa Ass'n Brief, supra note 144, at 16. Proponents note that an Iowa trail
occupies a railroad right-of-way intended to serve a planned coal-fired electric plant. Id. at
3.
171 Id. at 4.
172 Rail-Trail Mileage Surges Past 3,100, TRAILBLAZER, Apr.-June 1990, at 7.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Supreme Court: We Can Bank Them!, TRAILLAZER, Apr.-June 1990, at 1.
176 February Supreme Court Victory Spurs Movement to New Heights, TRAILBLAZER,
July-Sept. 1990, at 1.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
movement." 177 In addition, the publicity obtained from press coverage of the
case has helped to raise awareness of this issue among the general public. 178
A. Litigation Prospects
Settling the constitutionality of rails-to-trails conversions does not mean
that all relevant issues have been settled or that trail development will
henceforth go on unimpeded. The Fifth Amendment may still, depending on
state property law, require compensation for some trail conversions. Indeed,
Preseault's concurring opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, stressed that the
Court's holding did not preclude compensation for a trail conversion. 179
Opponents will also continue to use legal and procedural challenges that
may discourage interim trail uses of rights-of-way. One example is engaging in
litigation under the Tucker Act in attempts to obtain large compensation
awards. 180 Another example is seeking additional reporting requirements to
which trail operators or railroads must conform.' 8' Whether or not the
landowners' requests for compensation and regulatory safeguards are legitimate
or are attempts to block trail uses entirely, their challenges will impede trail
development to some extent.
B. Political Prospects
With the constitutionality question decided, most of the conflict will
probably move to the legislative arena. As shown by the alignment of groups
that filed amicus curiae briefs in Preseault, coalitions supporting or opposing
trail conversions have formed. 182 Some coalitions, such as those between land
developers and farmers, pair traditional enemies. This coalition building,
nonetheless, continues. Trail-use proponents are already attempting a political
alliance with the railroad industry. A "broad coalition" of trail supporters,
including the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, is promoting transportation
alternatives to automobiles. It has also decided to support policies to make
railroads more competitive with trucking. 183 Forming alliances with utilities
and pipeline companies to support trail conversions are sought. This is to be
177 Burwell, supra note 143, at 2.
178 Id.
179 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).180 Montange, supra note 161, at 14.
181 Rail Abandonments-Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails-Supplemental Trails Act
Procedures, ICC, May 18, 1989, available in WL FrRAN-ICC Database.
182 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
183 David Burwell, Preseault, Part H. Transportation, TRAILBLAZER, July-Sept. 1990,
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accomplished by pointing out that interim trail use will help to preserve those
corridors with which those companies are concerned. 184
IX. CONCLUSION
Both the Supreme Court and the ICC have kept the door open as to
compensation for rails-to-trails conversions. The Commission acknowledged
that compensation may be required under the Fifth Amendment. Likewise, the
Court held that landowners should pursue any compensation claims in the
Claims Court.18 5
A. Dual Purposes of the Trails Act Amendments
The center of the controversies concerns the permissible uses of a railroad
easement. If trail use concerns an easement, the issue of compensation does not
arise at all. Some flexibility is needed to deal with changes in technology and
circumstances and can be accommodated by traditional property laws dealing
with railroad easements. For example, a railroad easement obtained when coal-
fired locomotives were in use would not preclude its use by diesel locomotives.
Similarly, a railroad line originally used to haul freight could later be used for
commuter light-rail transportation.
At some point, though, the use becomes so dissimilar that the property has
been taken for another use. Arguments that railroad and recreational trail uses
are both "public uses" and so are necessarily within an easement's terms
appears to be stretching words a bit. 186 If recreation were the only purpose of a
rails-to-trails conversion, an abandonment of the railroad easement would seem
to follow.
The transportation aspect of interim trail use, however, complicates the
analysis. The federal Trails Act Amendments, as well as many similar state
statutes, declaie the objective of preserving railroad corridors for future
resumption of rail service. In this light, trail conversions look more like the
present use of public resources to accommodate future needs.187
In deciding whether a taking of property requiring compensation has
occurred, different approaches could be taken. Legislative and judicial
decisions could focus on which property use predominates-recreation or future
184 Montange, supra note 161, at 12.
185 For a general discussion of pre-Presauit controversies, see generally Thomas A.
Duda, Comment, The Use of Discontinued Railroad Rigths-of-Way as Recreational Hiking
and Biking Trails: Does the National Trails System Act Sanction Takings?, 33 Sr. Louis U.
LJ. 205 (1988); Thomas A. Jones, Comment, Rails to Trails: Converting America's
Abandoned Railroads Into Nature Trails, 22 AKRON L. REv. 645 (1989).
186 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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rail use. Allocating the value of the property interests between these uses could
also be used to determine compensation for a partial taking. If a taking of
property occurs, the amount of compensation likely hinges on the compensation
paid for the right-of-way initially. That is, whether the compensation for a
railroad easement was nominal or close to amounts paid for fee simple
interests.188
B. Proposed Changes to the Trails Act Amendments
In order to balance the interests of the general public and the landowners, a
number of changes should be made to the Trails System Amendments. First,
trail conversions should be made on a selective basis, instead of the Trails Act
Amendments' blanket premise that all rights-of-way are worth preserving.
Government agencies should decide which rights-of-way are suitable for
recreational trail use or future railroad transportation needs and permit the
remainder to revert to the adjoining landowners. 189
Second, specific appropriations amounts should be included in the federal
budget, instead of the present system under which Claims Court litigation
awards undetermined compensation amounts. 190 Establishing a specific funding
level helps people, through their representatives, to decide clearly how many
trails are worth the costs involved. Under the present procedure, the costs of
interim trail use is hidden, and compensation costs are unpredictable.
Third, government agencies and private groups promoting trail use should
cooperate with adjoining landowners in converting rights-of-way to interim trail
use. Proponents must be willing to work on minimizing adverse effects on
property lying along trails. 191 Measures include providing fencing and
restroom facilities along trails when necessary. 192 In return, adjoining
landowners should refrain from making unfounded and exaggerated claims
which are merely intended to impede trail development.
Fourth, additional research must be done on the impact and use of trail
conversions. Proponents and opponents disagree on the effects recreational
trails have on matters such as property values and crime rates. Present
188 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
189 Establishing standards for evaluating the feasibility and demand for potential rails-
to-trails conversions is a realistic objective. A set of criteria already applies to the selection
of potential national historic and scenic trails. 16 U.S.C. § 1244(b) (1988).190 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
191 Prior to passage of the Trail Act Amendments, Senator Domenici described the
problems caused by persens wandering off national trails. He believed that both damage to
adjoining property and lawsuits against landowners for personal injuries would be
adequately handled by the Amendment. 129 CoNG. REc. S956 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983)
(statement of Sen. Domenici). This assessment, however, now seems overly optimistic.
192 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5075.3(h), (i) (West 1984); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 148.630(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987).
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information on these matters largely consists of anecdotal evidence and isolated
studies of individual trails.193 Better information would help settle these
disputes and provide guidance in shaping the trail system to accommodate these
diverse interests.
Whatever doctrines are adopted at the federal and state levels, rails-to-trails
conversions will generate more than scholarly debate. Increased litigation as to
compensation for public-use takings awaits us. These litigation costs, along
with any actual compensation costs, will make the conversion of railroad
rights-of-way to recreational trails less attractive and more expensive.
Despite the significant costs of compensation and litigation, the Fifth
Amendment protects property from being taken for public use without just
compensation. The interests of adjoining landowners, trail users, and the
general public must all be considered. This includes giving all concerned a fair
hearing, whether taking the form of policy arguments for legislation or legal
claims for judicial relief. Interim trail use is a good idea, as it provides for both
recreational and transportation needs. Trail enthusiasts must still take care not
to let the advocacy of their cause blind them from giving compensation when
property is appropriated for public purposes. Adjoining landowners must also
be protected from property damage and legal liability likely to result from trail
use. Because interim trail use benefits society at large, select individuals should
not be made to bear the entire burden of costs and inconveniences. As such, the
principles of the Constitution are not to be compromised in the name of either
convenience or financial exigency.
Lawrence S. Lim*
193 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
* I would like to thank John Wengert and Mary Hess of the Rails-to-Trails
Conservancy and Robert E. Bash of the Ohio Farm Bureau for providing materials
explaining their respective policy positions.
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